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The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason,
Diversity, and Stability
(Forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy)

John Thrasher and Kevin Vallier
Abstract: John Rawls’s transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven
by his rejection of Theory’s account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is
the idea of public reason. We see Rawls’s account of stability as an attempt to solve a
mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls’s solution fails because his primary
assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public
reason relies on a condition of consensus that we argue is both unrealistic in modern,
pluralistic democracies and fragile. Rejecting his conception of public reason as unable to
maintain stability, we offer an “indirect alternative” that we believe is much more robust.
We offer experimental evidence to back up this claim.

John Rawls’s early conception of stability required a substantive ‘congruence’ between
the right and the good (1999: 496-505).1 He later rejected this view, however, believing it
was untenable in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Pervasive disagreement among
reasonable members of a well-ordered society will inevitably lead to a breakdown in
congruence; destabilizing institutions based on Justice as Fairness.2 In Political Liberalism,
Rawls attempted to avoid this problem by developing a conception of stability ‘for the

1

(Rawls 1999) is hereafter TJ. Many readers may be unfamiliar with Rawlsian ‘congruence,’ but the
concept is pivotal. See: (Weithman 2010), hereafter WPL? Throughout, we us PL to refer to (Rawls 2005).
2

Some Rawls scholars seem to believe that Rawls’s concern with stability was confined to PL. Martha
Nussbaum has recently claimed that ‘the central problem of [PL], as contrasted with [TJ], is that of
stability’ (Nussbaum 2011b, 2). Following Weithman, we think stability is central to TJ, though it is mostly
discussed in the oft-ignored Part III of TJ.

right reasons’ that obtains so long as citizens come to affirm a political conception of
justice consistent with their distinct reasonable comprehensive doctrines.3
Public reason, on this account, is the critical mechanism that generates stability.
The public, deliberative use of reason and argument drawn from the shared values of a
political conception of justice is key to any understanding of public reason. The
requirements of public reason are specified by a number of ‘guidelines’ the most
important of which is the duty of civility (Weithman 2010: 237). By offering and
responding only to public reasons, citizens comply with the duty of civility and thereby
build social trust. Social trust, in turn, stabilizes the political conception of justice. Citizens
come to trust one another and to support that political conception for the right reasons,
public reasons related to their own comprehensive doctrines. In this way, civility functions
as an assurance mechanism, helping citizens to view one another as jointly involved in
building a legitimate and just social order. The result, Rawls hoped, would be a wellordered society of citizens in a dynamically stable equilibrium—whose social dynamics
would be self-reinforcing.4
We claim that, contrary to Rawls’s hopes, the conception of public reason that
places the duty of civility at its center is inadequate to maintain a self-reinforcing social
equilibrium. Our argument follows Rawls in modeling stability as a kind of mutual
assurance game. Nevertheless, contra Rawls and his defenders, we show that the

3

That is, affirmed as legitimate, not necessarily as just. See (Rawls 2005: xlvi).

4

We follow Weithman in understanding ‘inherent stability’ and ‘stability for the right reasons’ as a kind of
Nash Equilibrium. In a game, strategies are in a Nash equilibrium when the strategy is the best response to
the best response of all the other players. In short, no one can do better by unilaterally changing their
strategy to some other strategy. A system that is in equilibrium in this way is inherently stable in just the
way that Rawls is concerned with; for instance, Rawls discuses stability as being a condition of ‘each
man’s best reply’ to others (Rawls 1999: §76, 435).
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assurance generated by the duty of civility is fragile. It can only produce stability under
unrealistic assumptions. Furthermore, these assumptions are the very ones that Rawls
rejected when he changed his account from TJ to PL. For Rawlsian public reason to
maintain stability, we need to assume away the very diversity that Rawls was rightly so
concerned with and, instead, assume that members of the well-ordered society share
common knowledge, beliefs, and goals. Without that assumption, stability is susceptible to
cascading breakdowns, as we will show in §3. Public reason as social deliberation, what
we call the direct public reason, can be easily undermined even in a well-ordered society.
In response to the problems with Rawls’s conception of public reason, we develop
an alternative view on which stability is produced through a process of indirect public reason,
that is, without direct, deliberative assurance that all affirm the political conception. To
show this, we offer a correlated equilibrium model of stability that contrasts to Rawls’s Nash
equilibrium model. Rawls’s conception of stability as an equilibrium depends, we argue,
on the implausible consensus condition. In contrast, a correlated equilibrium model can
dispense with the idea that members of the well-ordered society are in consensus. It can
instead generate and maintain social stability in the face of diversity and disagreement
through a social mechanism known as a choreographer.5 We argue that well-ordered
societies often contain many choreographers who coordinate behavior and generate
stable patterns of conduct over time. On this account, stability is indirectly provided when
citizens’ behavior and diverse modes of dialogue produce convergence on common
principles and rules. We believe our model is superior to Rawls’s for two reasons: (i) it can
generate stability under a wider range of favorable conditions and (ii) it relies on a more
realistic conception of social communication and diversity within liberal democracies.
5

We take this terminology from (Gintis 2009: 44).
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This paper has five parts. §1 explains the importance of stability and Rawls’s
conception of stability in PL. §2 analyzes PL’s account of stability based on direct public
reason. In §3, we argue that Rawls’s direct conception of public reason is fragile and liable
to breakdown in modern liberal societies characterized by reasonable pluralism. §4
develops an indirect conception of public reason that can meet the challenges we
advanced in §3. §5 concludes by showing how an idea of indirect public reason transforms
political liberalism in salutary ways.
1. The Problem of Stability
Contract theorists from Hobbes to Rawls have been concerned with how social order is
possible in a diverse and contentious social world. If individuals deeply and persistently
disagree about life’s most fundamental questions, many have doubted whether it is
possible to create and maintain a set of rules that all could endorse in order to resolve
disputes and organize cooperation. If it is not possible to find some kind of agreement on
societies basic rules, then such a society’s institutions will be unstable. To be stable, a
system of social rules must have the continuing assent of the diverse populations typical of
modern liberal democracies. Such stability is highly desirable: without it a conception of
justice either cannot perform its central task of creating the conditions for mutual
cooperation, or must be imposed by the use of force. Neither option is consistent with the
liberal conception of a just society.
Paul Weithman has recently argued that Rawlsian stability is best understood as a
‘condition of general equilibrium’ where ‘everyone knows that everyone else acts justly,
and each replies to the justice of others by being just himself’ (2010: 44). Stability comes
in two types: ‘inherent’ and ‘imposed’ (Weithman 2010: 44). Stability is imposed when a
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society’s institutional structure are stabilized through the sovereign state’s imposition of
political power, independently of (and even despite) the reasons of its citizens. Rawls
wished to show that ‘inherent stability’ is possible (1999: 436). Inherent stability obtains
when a ‘society that is well-ordered … generally maintains itself in a just general
equilibrium and is capable of righting itself when the equilibrium is disturbed’ (Weithman
2010: 45). ‘Forces within the system’ must generate this equilibrium (Rawls 1999: 401). In
PL, the idea of inherent stability becomes ‘stability for the right reasons’ (Rawls 2005:
xliii).6 A conception of justice is stable for the right reasons when citizens comply with
principles of justice for moral reasons and out of moral motives, not merely from
accidental or pragmatic considerations. Inherent stability, or stability for the right
reasons, is attractive because it is based on reason, not force. Consequently, inherently
stable institutions respect the freedom and equality of citizens.
Let us briefly review Rawls’s conception of inherent stability in TJ. Part III of TJ
argues that members of the well-ordered society will come to affirm Justice as Fairness as
regulative of their actions. Specifically, they endorse Justice as Fairness because they see it
as required by their ‘sense of justice.’ Nevertheless, Rawls openly asks whether each
person has reason to maintain her sense of justice. After all, some will see that they can
benefit by suppressing their sense of justice and taking advantage of the same sense of
justice in others (Rawls 1999: 435). This creates an assurance problem, as members of the
well-ordered society will realize that such defection is a live option for many people, even
for those who with a sense of justice because citizens may fear that others, less scrupulous
than themselves, will not abide by the rules of justice. In such a situation, acting in

6

Rawls dropped talk of ‘inherent’ stability in PL. We use ‘stability for the right reasons’ and ‘inherent
stability’ interchangeably as the element of ‘inherence’ we stress is more general than Rawls’s.
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accordance with one’s sense of justice would open one up to the exploitation and
predation of others who are less concerned with acting justly. Justice, on Rawls view, is
not a suicidal enterprise. Citizens must feel assured that if they act justly, others will do
the same. This is the heart of the assurance problem for stability. Without assurance, the
public conception of justice will not be stable because citizens will, fearing predation,
reasonably question whether they should act on their sense of justice.
Rawls attempted to solve this assurance problem by arguing that citizens have
independent reason to maintain their sense of justice outside of the benefits it brings
them. But they only have such reason when they endorse their sense of justice as part of
their good. Rawls calls this process ‘congruence,’ which links ‘the concepts of justice and
goodness’ (Rawls 1999: 498). Congruence obtains when citizens’ sense of justice are
endorsed from within their ‘thin theory of the good’—their conception of the good
separable from their sense of justice. The case that Rawls makes for congruence,
however, is conditional. It is only rational to maintain one’s sense of justice when others
do the same (Weithman 2010: 67). Rawls writes, ‘…even with a sense of justice men’s
compliance with a cooperative venture is predicated on the belief that others will do their
part’ (Rawls 1999: 336). Weithman argues that this mutual expectation of compliance
leads members of the well-ordered society into a kind of Nash equilibrium, where each
citizen has reason to act in a certain way because it is the best response to the actions of
everyone else (2010: 64). No citizen can improve her prospects by unilaterally changing
her mode of interaction. Rawls employs this language when he writes, ‘…I should like to
show that these principles [principles of justice] are everyone’s best reply, so to speak, to
the corresponding demands of other’ (1999: 103). In the well-ordered society, according
to Rawls, individuals lack sufficient incentive to deviate from the principles of justice. In
Page 6

this way, Justice as Fairness acquires inherent stability, as social divergence from Justice as
Fairness is self-correcting.
The greatest threat to inherent stability is the breakdown of assurance. For Rawls,
stability in a well-ordered society is fixed through a dynamic process of multiple
interactions between many persons over time (Rawls 1999: 434). These citizens must be
assured that they all affirm Justice as Fairness. If not, they will rightly fear being taken
advantage of and may preemptively opt out of the requirements of justice as a result.
Rawls claims that citizens may come to ‘lack full confidence in one another’ and ‘may
suspect that some are not doing their part, and so they may be tempted not to do theirs’
(1999: 211). This breakdown quickly leads to each individual seeking her own good rather
than complying with Justice as Fairness. If this suspicion becomes general it may
‘eventually cause the whole scheme to break down’ (Rawls 1999: 211). Thus, for Rawls,
these concerns about assurance arise even among members of a well-ordered society with
a robust sense of justice.7

7

Despite the limitations of two-person models, we can illustrate Rawls’s conception of the assurance
problem as a two-person assurance game, with the players representing two randomly selected segments of
the population. In this model, symmetrically represented populations have two options. First, they can
coordinate on a compliance equilibrium that maximizes mutual benefit, thereby acting on the public
principles of justice. This option is only beneficial if each population can assure the other that it will act on
the public principles of justice. Otherwise, they can choose the less risky, less beneficial alternative of
acting on their thin conception of the good—the non-compliance equilibrium. If they coordinate on
principles of justice they will benefit most; however, if one party decides to act from her thin conception of
the good, she gains more and the other person gains less than they would if they had both acted from their
(thin) good. This assurance game is represented below:

Comply
Don’t Comply

Comply
4, 4
3, 2

Don’t Comply
2, 3
3,3

This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibriums: both act comply with the principles of justice and both
act on their (thin) good. To benefit from acting on the principles of justice, each person must be assured
that others will do the same and vice versa. When there is a lack of confidence that the other party will
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To solve this mutual assurance problem, Rawls postulates that members of the
well-ordered society would affirm ideals that would give them independent reason to
endorse their sense of justice and thus Justice as Fairness.8 This endorsement makes
Justice as Fairness so central to one’s good that there is no point in deviating from the
public conception of justice. Each person in the well-ordered society will be motivated by
a sense of justice to comply with the public conception of justice and will know that
everyone else is motivated in the same way. Hence, common knowledge of compliance
obtains and mutual assurance is preserved.9
Rawls eventually came to believe, however, that TJ’s idea of the well-ordered
society was ‘unrealistic’ because it assumed that citizens shared the ideals associated with
Justice as Fairness.10 In order to share these ideals, all members have to accept a
conception of the person that includes a desire ‘to be and to be recognized by others as
being a certain kind of person’ (1974: 12-13). If members of the well-ordered society
reject this conception and the partial ‘comprehensive philosophical doctrine’ associated
with it, inherent stability will break down (Rawls 2005: xviii). This is why Rawls’s concern
with reasonable pluralism is so important. It is due to reasonable pluralism that citizens
will reject the ideals that buttress compliance with Justice as Fairness. We can see, then,
that TJ’s well-ordered society contains an internal dynamic that destroys the mutual
comply, acting on one’s (thin) good is the less risky strategy. If we can solve the assurance problem, then
the optimal equilibrium can be maintained.
8

Weithman discusses these ideals in (Wiethman 2010: 81). See also (Rawls 1999: 397-449) for an
extensive discussion of how this mechanism works.
9

We do not claim that common knowledge is required to maintain an assurance equilibrium, only that
Rawls believes it is necessary.
10

Specifically, Rawls thought that the argument of TJ, §86 failed. See (Weithman 2010: 234-269) for an
extensive discussion of this pivotal shift.
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assurance mechanism intended to produce inherent stability. Reasonable pluralism will
lead citizens to affirm different ideals and so their independent reason to comply with
Justice as Fairness may wane through entirely natural and admirable developments in
citizens’ philosophical, social, and religious commitments.
In response to this problem, Rawls converted Justice as Fairness into a ‘political
conception of justice’ in order to relax the degree to which citizens must share certain
ideals (Rawls 2005: 134). The political conception in turn becomes the object of an
‘overlapping consensus’ where citizens endorse the political conception from within their
distinct but reasonable comprehensive doctrines. So citizens can produce stability without
endorsing the partial comprehensive doctrine associated with Justice as Fairness in TJ.
Rawls also relaxed the congruence condition, arguing that stability is possible so long as
each reasonable view is ‘either congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict
with, the values appropriate to the special domain of the political as specified by a
political conception of justice’ (Rawls 2005: 169). In PL, so long as citizens have sufficient
reason to endorse the political conception regardless of their reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, stability is within reach. Reasons provided by the political conception need
merely ‘normally outweigh’ values and principles that might contradict or undermine
them (Rawls 2005: 156).
Yet, stability requires assurance even in PL, since citizens may still doubt that
others will abide by and internalize the political conception. Rawls must still claim that
citizens endorse the political conception based on shared ideals that Rawls came to call
‘political’ ideals (Weithman 2010: 271). If members of the well-ordered society find the
ideals associated with the political conception inspiring for their own sake, then they have
reason to internalize Justice as Fairness even if they think others may not do the same.
Page 9

They will thereby have reasons to internalize Justice as Fairness besides those
considerations that favor the conditional endorsement of accepting a common conception
of justice.
Rawls defends the need for shared ideals by arguing that ‘a political conception
assumes a wide role as part of public culture’ which contains a ‘certain conception of
citizens as free and equal’ (Rawls 2005: 71). The political conception includes an ‘ideal of
citizenship’ learned under conditions of ‘full publicity’ (Rawls 2005: 71). Citizens who see
themselves as free and equal wish to live under principles that each person has reason to
accept. Rawls therefore emphasized the ideal of public reason because citizens can use
public reasons to justify political principles to one another. These reasons develop and
refine an overlapping consensus, which in turn produces and preserves inherent
stability.11 Note the continuing presence of the assurance problem: despite the presence of
an overlapping consensus, citizens of the well-ordered society must still assure one
another that it exists.
If Rawls can resolve the assurance problem, he can establish that citizens have
overriding reason to maintain their desires to live up to the ideals of Justice as Fairness
(Weithman 2010: 299). However, solving the assurance problem requires that everyone
know that everyone else also accepts the public conception. Even the suspicion that
principles of justice are not shared can potentially undermine assurance. To quiet this
concern, Rawls argued that our conception of ourselves as free and equal implies that we
will engage in political justification governed by the liberal principle of legitimacy. This
principle holds that political power is justified only when it is compatible with a
11

Much molding of comprehensive doctrines to fit the political conception is done privately, among
adherents. Thus, public reason is not the only way to create an overlapping consensus. We thank Paul
Weithman for this point.
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constitution that all can ‘endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason’ (Rawls 2005: 137). If citizens comply with the principle, then
assurance is easier to generate as political justification occurs in commonly accepted
terms. In this way, citizens can tell that one another affirm the political conception.
Nevertheless, even the liberal principle of legitimacy requires refinement by employing
‘guidelines and criteria’ that are one of two ‘companion parts of one agreement’ made in
the original position (Rawls 2005: 226). With guidelines selected, reasonable
comprehensive doctrines will undergo a ‘transformative effect’ where they become more
compatible with the political conception. This, in turn, leads to inherent stability.
In sum, an internal dynamic created by reasonable pluralism leads to Rawls’s
mature conception of stability. Citizens of the well-ordered society must converge on a
political conception of justice that they have reason to endorse because of the ideals of
citizenship, friendship, etc. that it contains.12 In this way, citizens can maintain mutual
assurance of the public conception of justice. It is crucial that each person know that most
others also endorse the political conception. Consequently, they must be disposed to
speak to one another in terms of public reason in the public sphere. Even many followers
of Rawls miss these subtleties. For instance, Martha Nussbaum considerably
oversimplifies matters when she maintains, ‘political liberalism can provide stability,
provided that the holders of various comprehensive doctrines care sufficiently about
respect for persons’ (Nussbaum 2011a: 42). It is not enough for members of the wellordered society to care about respecting persons. Rawls’s conception of stability needs
assurance-generating mechanisms even among persons that see each other as free and

12

See (Weithman 2010: 270-300) especially pages 287-295.
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equal. We will now analyze Rawls’s preferred mechanism for maintaining assurance:
public reason.

2. Public Reason and the Duty of Civility
Public reason is, at least partly, a mechanism of mutual assurance. When citizens reason
in a public fashion, they can provide the assurance necessary to give each other reason to
endorse the political conception. Thus, if citizens use public reasons to justify the use of
political power, they are also assuring one another that they are committed to the public
conception. The offering of public reasons, on Rawls’s view, displays a commitment to
the political conception because citizens primarily speak in terms of political values and
reasons rather than reasons that derive from their comprehensive doctrines. Further, if
citizens speak in political terms, it suggests that they at least partly affirm the political
conception, given their willingness to discuss political issues within its confines. In this
way, the public use of reason can provide evidence for the existence of an overlapping
consensus (Weithman 2010: 328). For Rawls, doubts are ‘put to rest’ when ‘leaders of the
opposing groups … present in the public forum how their comprehensive doctrines do
indeed affirm [the] values [of the political conception]’ (Rawls 2005: 249). It is important
to emphasize the importance of public reason in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism.
Since reasonable disagreement is inevitable, citizens must justify the political conception
to themselves in their own terms. As Rawls claims, this ‘full justification’ is ‘left to each
person’ (Rawls 2005: 386). Given our diverse affirmations, we have strong reason to
assure one another of our allegiance to the political conception. We must be disposed to
speak in agreed upon and commonly accepted terms to produce assurance (Rawls 1997:
786).
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Citizens must also offer public reasons in accord with what Rawls calls the duty of
civility. The duty of civility is a moral duty to provide public reasons in a public forum and
to restrain one’s use of comprehensive reasons when constitutional essentials are at stake.
This duty performs an epistemic function because it is a guideline for the use of public
reasons.13 Specifying this function is a subtle matter. Rawls changed the content of this
duty not once, but twice. He initially advocated the ‘exclusive view’ of public reason that
‘on fundamental political matters, reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive
doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason’ (Rawls 2005: 247). The nice
feature of the exclusive view is that it prevents the ‘noise’ associated with comprehensive
doctrines from undermining mutual assurance. Rawls, though, quickly backed off the
exclusive view and moved to the ‘inclusive view’ of public reason which permits ‘citizens
… to present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their
comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the idea of public
reason itself’ (Rawls 2005: 247). Yet Rawls later rejects even the inclusive view for the
‘wide view’ of public reason which holds that citizens can introduce comprehensive
reasons into political discussion so long as ‘in due course proper political reasons … are
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced
are said to support’ (Rawls 1997: 784). By complying with the wide view, members will
provide one another with explanations for why they comply with the political conception.
This process of providing explanations to one another generates assurance. Rawls claims
that the advantage of ‘the mutual knowledge of citizens’ recognizing one another’s

13

The duty of civility is not meant merely as an assurance mechanism. It also helps characterize Rawls’s
conception of civic culture.
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reasonable comprehensive doctrines bring out a positive ground for introducing such
doctrines’ (Rawls 1997: 784).
One reason that Rawls may have embraced the wide view is that it permits
diverse procedures for providing assurance. For instance, Rawls maintains that the wide
view permits ‘reasoning by conjecture’ whereby citizens with one reasonable
comprehensive doctrine can engage those with distinct and conflicting reasonable
comprehensive doctrines on the latter doctrines’ own terms (Rawls 1997: 783). In this
way, Rawls permits citizens to assure one another even with the use of private reasons.
Further, the duty of civility is plausibly read as requiring relatively little effort on the part
of citizens, giving them less disincentive to speak in public terms. According to Paul
Weithman, this interpretation allows Rawlsian citizens to use their comprehensive
doctrines ‘without adducing public reasons in support of their positions, so long as their
doing so does not lead others to doubt that they acknowledge the authority of the public
conception of justice’ (Weithman 2010: 330). If doubts do not arise, the proviso is never
triggered. Citizens need only comply with the wide view if they think ‘…assurance is
actually needed’ (Weithman 2010: 331).
Publicly reasoning in accord with the duty of civility consistently reinforces
assurance in a well-ordered society. This creates a condition of common knowledge or
consensus.14 This condition, according to Rawls, builds over time. As Weithman argues,
‘common knowledge of an overlapping consensus is not based only, or even primarily, on
what citizens say issue-by-issue in the public forum’ but rather that such knowledge builds
14

We understand the common knowledge or consensus requirement as holding that every member of the
well-ordered society has, in Bayesian terms, ‘common priors’ including the knowledge of the rules of the
game and the rational strategies of each other player. Everyone must also know that everyone else has the
relevant knowledge and so on. Arguably, Rawls affirmed a common knowledge requirement, though we
deny that a common knowledge requirement is necessary to provide assurance.
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up ‘over time’ (Weithman 2010: 331). This explains why Rawls claimed ‘the details about
how to satisfy this proviso [the wide view] must be worked out in practice and cannot
feasibly be governed by a clear family of rules given in advance’ (Rawls 1997: 784). We
cannot make sense of how to satisfy the proviso in the abstract. Thus, the duty of civility
maintains assurance over an extended series of iterated interactions among millions of
citizens, many of which do not trigger the duty at all.15
Using the duty of civility within public reason to ensure stability is an elegant
solution to the mutual assurance problem. Nevertheless, as we argue in the next section, it
is not robust enough to maintain assurance over time. Consensus based stability is
unlikely to survive within diverse modern liberal democracies.

3. The Fragility of Consensus
Stability, as we have seen, is conditional on the maintenance of mutual assurance in the
well-ordered society. Mutual assurance is based on the common knowledge that members
of the well-ordered society are committed to abiding by the requirements of the public
conception of justice—on consensus. In this section, we reject the consensus requirement
because it is difficult to maintain and because it can be easily undermined. In short, it is
fragile. Much of our argument is drawn from experimental and behavioral data that
shows the fragility of maintaining consensus in laboratory settings (Gintis 2009: 153). This
evidence is strong, we argue, because if it is difficult to maintain stable equilibria via
consensus in controlled lab environments, it should be even harder to maintain them in
the diverse and often contentious environment of modern liberal democracies.
15

If assurance is dynamic, we can see why the duty of civility largely restricts citizens’ behavior rather than
encouraging it. Since assurance keeps a society in equilibrium as learning builds, the duty need only
provide resistance when society seems to move out of equilibrium..
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Consequently, we argue that consensus based stability is fragile and liable to
disintegration even under favorable conditions. We describe Rawls’s model of providing
consensus as a conception of direct public reason, where citizens’ direct deliberation with one
another provides assurance.16 However, as we will argue below, assurance provided by
direct public reason can be undermined by noise and drift.17 Direct public reason is, we
argue, thereby unable to maintain stability. To have a stable system of justice without
rejecting wide conception of the duty of civility, we must move to an indirect conception
of public reason.
We stress here that the problems we raise are based on game theoretic and
experimental models that should apply even to members of the well-ordered society with
a robust sense of justice. If assurance problems plague Rawls’s view, then the phenomena
we cite can plague his view as well, even under his idealized conditions. Thus, we are not
charging Rawls’s model with being unrealistic but rather that his own conditions cannot
generate their intended result.
Before we develop our criticisms, we should say a bit more about the sense in
which Rawls advocates a direct model of assurance provision. It is true that Rawls does
not rely exclusively on a direct method of assurance, given that laws can often play this
role. Consider: ‘in a well-ordered society there would be no need for the penal law except

16

Rawls does not rely exclusively on a direct method of assurance, given that laws can often play this role.
Consider: ‘in a well-ordered society there would be no need for the penal law except insofar as the
assurance problem made it necessary’ (Rawls 1999: 277). Nevertheless, the law alone cannot produce
stability for the right reasons; it can only keep people in line. Therefore, Rawls’s main assurance
mechanism is direct. If the direct assurance mechanism fails, given the amount of time Rawls spent
developing it, the secondary indirect mechanisms will probably not be strong enough to salvage the system.
We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
17

It is worth pointing out that we, like Rawls, are not really concerned with how the assurance equilibrium
is attained, we are only concerned with the question of whether the equilibrium is stable once attained.
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insofar as the assurance problem made it necessary’ (Rawls 1999: 277). Nevertheless, law
alone cannot produce stability for the right reasons; it can only keep people in line, as is
clear throughout Rawls’s discussion. One might counter, that Rawls can appeal to
another alternative mechanism, observation of mutual compliance with the political
conception. Observation without direct assurance, however, is subject to different
interpretations; citizens might think that others are simply complying due to social or
political pressure or because they are confused. Unless citizens are prepared to directly
assure one another, simple observation cannot do the job. We believe Weithman agrees,
since citizens must provide assurance ‘by actually adopting and reasoning from the
“unified perspective” the public conception of justice provides’; similarly, the duty of
civility ‘requires citizens to adopt and deliberate in their ‘common point of view’
(Weithman 2010: 331). Therefore, we think we are on solid ground in holding that
Rawls’s main assurance mechanism is direct. Without direct assurance, the entire model
collapses. Other forms of assurance are insufficient on their own. Rawls arguably thought
as much, as evidenced by the amount of time he spent developing the duty of civility visà-vis his fleeting remarks about alternatives.18
Two problems undermine stability under direct public reason: noise and
amplification. Noise is the problem of distinguishing between communication by citizens
that signal allegiance to the public conception, and hence assurance, and those that do
not. For instance, once the wide view of public reason is adopted, individuals may present
reasons in the public sphere that are, in fact, sectarian or merely self-interested so long as
some public justification can be given in due course. Once those other reasons are

18

We thank Paul Weithman and an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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allowed, however, it will be difficult if not impossible to distinguish public reasons based
on the public conception from those that are not so based.
Since citizens are able, on the wide view of civility under direct public reason, to
introduce some private reasons into the public sphere, it becomes difficult to tell when
citizens are advancing public reasons or not. Specifically, the presence of other forms of
reasons may make it difficult to tell when citizens are advancing public reasons in the
cacophony of the public sphere. Since the public provision of reasons is the primary way
that citizens signal their allegiance to the political conception of justice, true signals of
allegiance must be easily distinguishable from noise. However, on the wide view,
deliberative noise would likely be substantial. This holds even if everyone sincerely
attempts to signal his or her allegiance along with other forms of political discourse.
Consider an example familiar to American readers.19 Once sectarian and other
reasons are allowed into the public sphere, it is impossible to know, for instance, whether
defenders of various restrictions on abortion are presenting reasons that are consistent
with the public conception of justice. Are they merely couched in the language of
sectarian comprehensive justifications (e.g. religious or moral) or do they reflect a more
fundamental rejection of the public conception of justice? It is hard to know. This is the
sense in which assurance signals become noisy when sectarian and comprehensive
reasons are allowed in given the wide view. Noise happens when additional signals are
introduced that make it impossible for citizens to distinguish between public
communication that provides assurance and public communication that signals a move
away from the public conception.

19

We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example.
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If we follow Rawls in modeling stability as an assurance game, noise can be
modeled as ‘cheap talk.’20 Cheap talk is costless or very inexpensive, non-binding
communication in a game. Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart describe cheap talk among
players in a game as follows: ‘the players don’t strike, don’t get educated, and don’t issue
guarantees; they simply talk. They may or may not tell the truth, and may or may not
believe each other’ (Aumann and Hart 2003: 1619). The problem is not that members of
the well-ordered society will lie to one another about their allegiance to the political
conception; only that in noisy conditions they will lose their confidence (that is, assurance)
that they have reason to trust that others will abide by the political conception. In turn,
this will tend to undermine consensus. Traditional game theory clearly suggests this
conclusion. Robert Aumann, for instance, argued that in an assurance game similar to
the one we have been discussing, the mutual assurance equilibrium can not be sustained
under conditions of cheap talk, where there are gains for moving to the risk-dominant
equilibrium. In the understanding of the stability model that Rawls uses we would,
therefore, have good reason to think that noise would undermine consensus based
stability when that consensus is based on noisy assurance signals (Aumann 1990).21

20

For a balanced overview of cheap talk, see (Farrell and Rabin 1996). One might reasonably worry that
noisy communication would not really be “cheap” in a well ordered society because informal social norms
would impose costs on those who introduce sectarian, comprehensive reasons into public discourse. This,
we believe, misunderstands the “width” of the wide view of public reason. The wide view does not impose
sanctions on persons for offering comprehensive reasons (so long as political reasons are not forthcoming),
and so it imposes no sanctions on persons who would introduce noisy signals. There is good reason, then,
to think that the introduction of such signals will be cheap, in lieu of some unknown norm to the contrary.
We thank an anonomous reviewer for raising this concern.
21

The risk dominant equilibrium in the game represented above in footnote 8 is {Don’t Comply, Don’t
Comply}. Technically speaking, players will move to the risk-dominant, sub-optimal equilibrium. This will
only happen when the gains from the pay-off dominant equilibrium are not so high that assurance is
unnecessary. We are claiming that “cheap talk” leads to convergence on the risk-dominant equilibrium,
only, as Aumann claims, that pre-play agreement or assurance based on “cheap talk” is ineffectual. It
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We might question how troubling this conclusion should be. Do we really have
good reason to believe that members of the well-ordered society will do what traditional
game theory suggests and move away from the consensus when consensus is based on
reliable signals of assurance?22 One might argue, for instance, that since ‘talk is cheap’ it
should have little effect on the stability of a given equilibrium. A so-called ‘babbling
equilibrium’ might not necessarily be different from mutual assurance consensus
equilibrium. Brian Skyrms has argued, however, that this is a mistake. In large
populations with random encounters, Skyrms shows that the introduction of cheap talk
can destabilize a mutual assurance consensus equilibrium (Skyrms 2004: 65-82).
The experimental evidence comes to similar conclusions, though the evidence is
slightly weaker.23 In general, pre-play, non-binding communication does seem to increase
the tendency to cooperate in social dilemmas (Sally 1995). This tendency decreases
significantly, however, as the numbers of interaction increases (Sally 1995: 78).
Furthermore, Cristina Bicchieri found that the tendency to cooperate in these cases
significantly increases if some form of group identity is created (Bicchieri 2002). There are
other experimental settings, however, where cheap talk does regularly undermine
assurance. Subjects will initially cooperate with others, but once even a small number of
players decide that they have reason to pursue their own gain at the expense of the
consensus, cooperation rapidly breaks down. Surprisingly, cooperation decreases when
cannot create the assurance we claim is necessary in the model public assurance game. Insofar as noise
makes all public assurance “cheap talk,” we claim that this would publicly undermine assurance based on
genuine signals that others will endorse and comply with the public conception. We thank an anonymous
reviewer for helping us clarify this point.
22

Technically speaking, the players will move to the risk dominant equilibrium.
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For instance, it must be admitted that cheap talk experiments tend to be run in small groups where little is
at stake. Still, the experimental evidence is highly suggestive.
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cheap talk is permitted before each round of game play as a method of assuaging worried
defectors (Wilson and Sell 1997: 695).
In one experiment, researchers found that cheap talk tended to be more effective
in a face-to-face setting. This led them to conclude that the effectiveness of cheap talk
communication

crucially

depends

upon

‘institutional

context

in

which

that

communication takes place’ (Wilson and Sell 1997: 714). Public forums where citizens
interact on a personal basis make signaling loyalty easier relative to larger, impersonal
settings. Of course, in a well-ordered society interactions will be largely anonymous and
vast in scale. Consequently, the assurance situation that will obtain in the well-ordered
society will probably tend to look a lot like Skyrms’s model. We have good reason to
believe then, that the effect of noise will tend to undermine stability, though it is
impossible to identify the degree in the abstract. There is good reason to believe then
that, given the formal and experimental evidence, that cheap talk and noise will lead
consensus-based equilibriums maintained by direct public reason on a large scale to
become unstable.
Rawlsians are bound to claim that much of this experimental work is irrelevant for
criticizing Rawls’s view because real-world subjects differ substantially from members of
the well-ordered society. Rawls, for instance, introduces the notion of an ideal of public
reason that could, potentially, be used to sanction legislators and other public figures that
introduce noisy or non-public reasons (Rawls 1997: 767-769). Consequently, Rawlsians
will argue that we have little reason to think that these real-world problems will arise in
Rawls’s model. The problems we cite, however, do not depend on motivations other than
those that derive from the rational and reasonable psychologies of members of the wellordered society. The empirical and formal literature suggests that cheap talk will pose a
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problem even if all parties are motivated by their good and their sense of justice, as they
may still have doubts that others’ words will not be backed up by actions. After all, even
Rawls thinks members of the well-ordered society have reason to defect if they do not
believe others will do likewise. The reason for this is that Rawls allowed comprehensive
reasons that support the political conception to enter into public discourse, so it will be
hard to sanction public officials for introducing non-public, and so often noisy, reasons,
either by using the ideal of public reason or in the background culture.
The second problem for consensus on the wide view of direct public reason is an
amplification of noise. This is the problem of errors in communication multiplying over
large numbers of interaction, a phenomena we term informational drift. Small errors,
when

so

multiplied,

can

quickly

lead

to

a

cascade

of

misunderstanding,

miscommunication, and divergence in interpretation. This informational drift can create
‘informational cascades’ that can dramatically undermine mutual assurance consensus
equilibria.24 Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt explain that an informational cascade
‘occurs when initial decisions coincide in a way that it is optimal for each of the
subsequent individuals to ignore his or her private signals and follow the established
pattern’ (Anderson and Holt 1997: 847). That is, a signaling error can become a public
norm. A classic example is a financial market bubble. Vernon Smith and David Porter
created small-scale asset bubbles in laboratories where traders continue to sell and buy
assets even after the underlying value went to zero (Porter and Smith 1994). Furthermore,
continued experience in the market does not significantly reduce the prevalence of
bubbles in these conditions (Smith et. al. 2008). Nobody wanted to be the last holding the
asset and therefore continued to sell zero-valued assets up to the point of market collapse.
24

For an influential account, see (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992).
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Robust bubbles formed especially when public information was ‘cheap’ and noisy (Porter
and Smith 1994: 122). This result is very robust across many different population groups,
leading us to believe that it is not a product of a particular psychological assumption.
For similar reasons, we sometimes see a similar effect in stock-market panics.
There is confusion about the underlying asset value of certain stocks leading traders to
interpret the behavior of other traders as signaling information about underlying assets.
The problem is that, in circumstances of noisy information, signals can be misinterpreted.
The fact that one of these cascades catches on does not necessarily communicate any
information about the underlying asset itself, but instead merely reflects the incorrect
beliefs of the traders. Cascades can spread quickly and ‘can be upset by the arrival of new
public information’ (Porter and Smith 1994: 122). As a result, cascades are frequently
unpredictable. In controlled laboratory settings, experimenters find that agents are most
susceptible to information cascades when they are asked to make public decisions based
on private information.
This susceptibility is reflected in the stability problem faced by members of the
well-ordered society. They are more like the subjects in the asset bubble experiments or
traders in financial markets than traders in more stable market situations are. Citizens in
the public forum use their private information to send public signals about the content of
the political conception and the guidelines of public reason, along with their respective
endorsement of both. Other citizens must interpret those signals as public information
often without knowing the source of the signals or their causal history. This is especially
true of public figures like members of Congress, where support for a piece of legislation
may have less to do with the considerations of justice than with its value for the political
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actor in terms of future votes or allegiance to ideology. When a public person gives
reasons in the legislature, how are we to understand that signal?
Stability maintained by direct public reason is fragile because the wide view of
civility permits noisy signaling that can be amplified by informational drift. These
problems will arise even in a well-ordered society, as the phenomena do not require that
agents be unreasonable or substantially misinformed. Accordingly, it seems that Rawls’s
attempt to identify a social mechanism to produce mutual assurance fails. One might
worry that this failure threatens his entire theoretical project, but to conclude as much
would be premature. We believe that by replacing Rawls’s conception of direct public
reason with a conception of indirect public reason, we can save stability for the right
reasons. If we are successful, Rawlsians will have strong reason to endorse an indirect
account of public reason.

4. Indirect Public Reason
In the last section, we argued that direct public reason is fragile. The wide view of civility
allows costless signaling of reasons, which undermines stability. To solve this problem, we
must increase the cost of signaling so that citizens can be confidently assured that their
fellows share the public conception of justice. If we increase the cost of noise and
informational error, it seems that we must also increase the cost of signaling assurance.
Increasing the cost of signaling, however, requires retreating from the wide view to the
inclusive or exclusive view of civility, as public discourse would need to be stripped of
extraneous talk. Such restrictions should be unattractive to political liberals who care
about protecting freedom of speech and expression. Further, the problems of confusion
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and drift remain, as members of the well-ordered society will be subject to error even
under more restrictive conditions.
In response, we might decrease the cost of assurance by permitting more
assurance-providing techniques, but doing so seems to further open the door to error as
cheap talk will become an increasingly common phenomenon. Further, given an increase
in methods and a decrease in restrictions, noise will increase as well. Either way, the
direct approach to public reason seems like a dead end.
On analogy, we can imagine an assurance game with drivers at an intersection.
Assurance mechanisms are required to allow drivers to cross the intersection safely
without crashing into one another. First, imagine a case with no stop signs or lights. In
this case, drivers have to use lights, horns and eye contact to coordinate, which is rather
costly. The processes are subject to error, frustration, and confusion and in the end
require drivers to slow down considerably or to crash into one another. This is analogous
to the conception of direct public reason. We can improve matters with stop signs, say at
a four-way stop. However, as the number of cars increase, the amount of direct
coordination required would become more costly as drivers must still determine who first
arrived at the light. We have all been in these situations. Four-way stops are terribly
inefficient in high traffic areas. We can see then that all of these methods of direct
communication with drivers have serious limitations with respect to the cost of assurance.
The obvious solution to our traffic problem is to install a traffic light. Traffic lights
correlate coordination among drivers to an independent, public signal—traffic light. By
following a traffic light, drivers no longer need to directly assure one another of their
intentions by signaling. Instead, they realize that it is in everyone’s best interest to follow
the public signal. The traffic light thereby dramatically reduces the epistemic problems
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associated intersections. To put it in game-theoretic terms, the traffic light creates a
correlated equilibrium. Herbert Gintis calls correlating mechanisms like traffic lights
‘choreographers.’ On this model, the choreographer generates assurance indirectly.
Choreographers significantly aid the process of forming and maintaining assurance
because players no longer need to coordinate directly; they gain from simply abiding by
the directions of the choreographer (Gintis 2010: 252). With the correlation mechanism
in place, no driver can do better by unilaterally deviating from the direction of the traffic
light; hence, the new correlating mechanism creates a new, stable convention.25
Choreography, though, does not arise ex nihilo. For a correlated equilibrium to be
effective, the choreographer must use comprehensible signals that parties can respond to
effectively. One way this process occurs is through a ‘salience’ creation mechanism.
Thomas Schelling, in his classic The Strategy of Conflict, introduced the idea of salience via
his theory of focal points in coordination games. In a pure coordination game, players
gain from choosing identical or related strategies. For instance, in a meeting game where
two players try to locate one another, each gains only if they both choose to meet at the
same spot. In most games, the destination is irrelevant so long as both parties end up
there. Schelling pointed out that doing well in such a game requires stumbling on some
salient property of one option that the other player will also pick-up on (Schelling
1960/1980: 57-58). However, Schelling emphasizes that finding salience in a
coordination game is more art than science. Correlated equilibriums will be effective only
insofar as parties notice some antecedently salient feature of the world. Conventions often
25

A correlated equilibrium, then, is a Nash Equilibrium for a ‘super game’ that includes at least three
parties. In our example, these parties are drivers in perpendicular lanes and a traffic light. The traffic light
or choreographer makes the first move. Then the other two players can do no better than obey the traffic
light. In this case, the ‘super game’ is the two-step game where the choreographer moves and then the two
drivers move.
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evolve that are salient to many agents, such as basic rules of the road.26 However, without
those antecedent conventions, a choreographer like the traffic light will lack the salience
necessary to effectively correlate agents’ behavior.
Drift and noise, of course, can occur even with a choreographer. The problem of
stability, however, is not that agents cannot deviate from public standards. Instead, the
problem is to sufficiently reduce drift and noise so that stability for the right reasons can
form and survive. A correlated equilibrium conception of stability under indirect public
reason makes the formation problem less severe because the assurance of public
endorsement is generated indirectly through a public, external event rather than through
noisy, misleading direct assurance mechanisms. The primary challenge for indirect public
reason conception is not merely to identify the relevant choreographers but to explain
how they gain salience within a liberal society. In the next section, we attempt to meet
this challenge.

5. Stability in a Liberal Society
Rawls’s conception of stability is based on a direct model of public reason, where citizens
directly assure one another of their loyalty to the political conception of justice
(Weithman 2010: 331) By directly assuring one another in accord with the duty of civility,
citizens of the well-ordered society will comply with the dictates of the political
conception. However, if we replace Rawls’s direct conception of public reason with an
indirect conception of public reason, members of the well-ordered society need only
follow the relevant public choreographer and believe that others will do the same. Far less
direct assurance is required. On both views, citizens of the well-ordered society must
26

Conversation with Robert Sugden influenced our thinking on the importance salience in conversation.
See also (Sugden 1995).
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judge that their balance of reasons favors maintaining their desire to follow the political
conception. Nevertheless, the indirect conception of public reason employs assurance
mechanisms other than the duty of civility. Because of this, the duty of civility loses some
of its importance on an indirect conception of public reason. Members of the wellordered society can rationally accord priority to the political conception so long as their
society contains salient publicly recognized choreographers directing them to do so. The
Rawlsian project only needs public choreographers to provide assurance on the indirect
model.
Who are the public choreographers in a well-ordered society? At the most general
level, choreographers are events, like the changing of the traffic light. However,
choreographers can come in a variety of types: (i) deliberate and spontaneous, (ii)
individual and group, (iii) macro and micro. First, choreographed events can be produced
deliberately or spontaneously. For instance, traffic lights produce choreographed events
because civil engineers program them to do so. In contrast, correlated norms can arise
spontaneously so long as there is a publicly recognized event that organizes behavior.
Second, choreography can be performed either by individuals or by groups.27 A judge

27

An anonymous reviewer wonders whether Rawls might be able to solve the assurance problem in an
indirect way different from the one that we suggest. Rawls, in his reply to Habermas, writes that ‘since
there are far less doctrines than citizens, the latter may be grouped according to the doctrine they hold.
More important than the simplification allowed by this numerical fact is that citizens are members of
various associations into which, in many cases, they are born, and from which they usually, though not
always, acquire their comprehensive doctrines’ (Rawls 1995: 15). Because there are only a small number of
comprehensive doctrines, the reviewer suggests that this will simplify the assurance task, as Rawls
suggests, and make assurance ‘indirect’ since it will be provided through groups of doctrines rather than to
individuals directly. This is an intriguing suggestion and there is not space to address it completely here but
there are two reasons we think this version of ‘indirect assurance’ is not sufficient. First, Following Gerald
Gaus, we believe there are serious problems in individuating comprehensive ‘doctrines’ as a whole from
sectarian reasons (2003:180-186). If this fear is well-founded, the idea that members of a comprehensive
doctrine can be organized in groups is misleading. Second, even if citizens can be grouped as the reviewer
suggests, the fragility problem and the assurance problem reproduce at the level of the group. Members of
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may serve as a correlated equilibrium when she issues a verdict, but a congressional body
may do the same. Finally, choreographers can exist at different levels of social
organization. Assurance is not provided directly, that is between groups of citizens, but
instead indirectly through, for example, recognized fealty to public courts of law. Such
recognition allows the courts to play a choreographing role.28 Alternatively, choreography
can arise from a plurality of local choreographers, such as local statutes and ordinances
set by citizens and counties. Society-wide stability can be generated at the federal level or
in a piecemeal fashion from these local bodies of law.
Choreographers, it seems, are ubiquitous.29 When we recognize their legitimacy,
that is when they are salient, they produce inherent stability. Public discussion is only part
of this process, as most assurance is indirect.30 On the indirect view, citizens’ activities
produce stability, but not through direct, deliberative, intentional assurance. For instance,
when we argue about the proper interpretation of the First Amendment, even if we
appeal to non-public reasons, we implicitly assume that each party to the discussion
affirms the principles underlying it. Our discourse indicates that we all endorse the
constitution despite our differing interpretations. In this way, public discourse, even

the group will have to assure one another that they do, in fact, share doctrines for this ‘indirect’ solution to
work. We believe this is unlikely but, again, a full reply would likely require another paper.
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The Supreme Court, for instance, provides reasons for its decisions, but they primarily affect future
choreographing events rather than providing assurance to the public (the reasoning of the Supreme Court is
very complex). We thank Micah Schwartzman for this point.
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A point that Rawls would, no doubt, admit. The point is the role that the choreographers play in the
assurance mechanism.
30

Members of the well-ordered society may have other mechanisms available, but Rawls only discusses the
duty of civility, which is why we focus on it.
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disagreement, produces assurance by indirectly providing evidence of acceptance and
compliance with the public conception.31
In our view, public choreographers are primarily bodies of norms, often legal
though sometimes informal or formal moral norms. By focusing on indirect rather than
direct assurance through public reason, the theoretical focus shifts from public reasons to
public rules. Rawls wants to build discourse around public reasons in order to produce
direct assurance. However, if public reasons by themselves cannot generate and maintain
inherent stability, then a core motivation for focusing on public reasons is undermined.
Shared discourse can help demonstrate our commitment to compliance, but this
demonstration can occur in many, often non-public ways. The idea of a correlated
equilibrium reorients us towards focusing on public events that consist in the creation,
affirmation, revision, or rejection of publicly recognizes rules of conduct. The idea of
public rules can be understood as a form of indirect public reason.
A key difference in our model of stability is that, in contrast to Rawls, we need not
know one another’s reasons for complying with choreographers. Rawls seems open to this
when he notes that ‘[Members of the well-ordered society] take into account and give
some weight to only the fact—the existence—of the reasonable overlapping consensus
itself’ rather than looking to the comprehensive reasons that citizens affirm the political
conception (Rawls 2005: 387). Rawlsians, however, will surely object. Rawls’s concerns
about publicity indicate that he wants to base social institutions not merely on public rules
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A reviewer worries that debates about the interpretation of shared principles will not provide assurance
unless persons are broadly committed to certain values and principles of constitutional interpretation. This
assurance can be provided via choreography as well, specifically by honoring the adjudicative mechanisms
that put constitutional interpretation into practices, such as the Supreme Court. We must proceed with care
here, lest we fall back into the intuition that the only mode of assurance provision is through a commitment
to shared reasoning rather than shared practices.
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but on public rationales. Thus, Rawls insists that the ‘full justification of the public
conception of justice’ should be ‘publicly known, or better, at least to be publicly
available’ (Rawls 2005: 67). Unless the rationales are public, something important may be
lost, such as a sense of fellow-feeling among citizens. Yet, while something important may
be lost, we cannot see any reason to think that stability will be.
There may well be some cost to abandoning the publicity of rationales, but given
the importance of an adequate account of stability, the costs are likely worth paying. And
we reemphasize that stability need not depend on the publicity of rationales. For one
thing, the correlated equilibrium model shows that inherent stability can be achieved
without them, and second, making rationales reliably public in Rawls’s sense is difficult,
given the phenomena of noise and drift. Thus, we stress that traditional Rawlsians simply
adopt a faulty conception of stability. Stability for the right reasons can be maintained so
long as social processes and institutions associated with the political conception are
publicly recognized and followed.
Our model compensates for weaknesses in Rawls’s view, but one advantage of
Rawls’s mature conception of stability is that we can more easily see how a society can
move from a modus vivendi to an overlapping consensus with inherent stability. If we can
converge on an overlapping consensus, then citizens can directly assure one another of
their loyalty to it and even their commitment to creating it. Direct assurance mechanisms
clarify how persons can rationally recognize the overlapping consensus and demonstrate
their allegiance to it. Indirect assurance cannot get off the ground unless choreographers
already exist and their antecedent conditions are already met. How then do we select
public choreographers? We cannot appeal to direct assurance for the reasons discussed
above. We seem stuck in a chicken-and-egg problem—we cannot comply with
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choreographers until they are recognized, but we cannot use choreographers to converge
on them in the first place.
In response, consider an analogy drawn from ship construction. We can conceive
of ship construction in two ways. Ordinarily, a group of builders gets together and
produces a blueprint. Once the ship is complete, all recognize that the ship matches the
blueprint and can then use the ship to cooperate with one another when they set sail.
Rawls’s mature conception of stability is akin to construction of this sort. In the first stage,
members of the well-ordered society agree on a social ‘blueprint’ that will satisfy their
common aims (the political conception) and then they must check to see if they agree with
the final product (the production of an overlapping consensus). Finally, when the ship is
finished, they must publicly agree that the ship has been properly constructed in accord
with the blueprint (the assurance process).
Contrast the blueprint model with repairs to a ship at sea, following Otto
Neurath’s famous example. In this case, the ship’s crew cannot build a new ship from
scratch since they are in the middle of the ocean. But even without a blueprint, they can
identify defects, leaks and structural problems. Further, sailors face a fundamentally
different problem from ship builders. Their problem is not to discern what a perfect ship
looks like, but how to make reasonable, piecemeal improvements. Even if the ship was
poorly constructed at first, sailors can construct a better ship over time. The crew need
only work off a publicly recognized framework of rules of repair and the use of shared
materials.
Our model of inherent stability is closer to the latter form of ship construction, as
it assumes that the relevant type of stability is already in place. Some social structure must
already be in operation for an overlapping consensus to develop. Thus, any society that
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develops an overlapping consensus must already have a network of choreographers in
operation. These choreographers need not be perfect or even wholly legitimate. Instead,
they provide the cooperative ‘social capital’ out of which a just society can be built.
Citizens of a not-quite-well-ordered society can move towards justice with a set of norms
and choreographers already active. Note that they can do so only if some of their
choreographers are regarded as legitimate. Otherwise, there are no legitimate
choreographers available to move society towards a more justified set of norms. Thus,
stability for the right reasons is no mere output of the process of political justification but
an input as well. The indirect idea of public reason holds that we must begin moving
towards a just society with imperfect forms of stability that are improved over time. In this
way, we can locate a middle ground between merely practical and inherent stability, for
most stable liberal democracies combine the two. Sometimes stability is imposed through
state violence and oppression by some social classes.32 Other times, stability is maintained
and perfected through a public recognition of fairness.
The Rawlsian ideal of stability becomes a regulative ideal for repairing and
refining one’s institutions, for moving from the impure social ore of the present to a fully
just social product. In this way, our model differs from Rawls’s model. We might interpret
Rawls’s project in PL as a ‘possibility proof’ for an ideally just liberal democracy. In other
words, he merely attempts to specify the conditions under which such a society is possible.
Our model is both more and less ambitious. It is more ambitious because we want to
show how stability can be reached from our present conditions.33 Nevertheless, it is also
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For a sophisticated treatment of this conception of stability, see (Kavka 1983).
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Ryan Muldoon in his work has argued, for instance, that diverse deliberative and non-deliberative
settings can lead to robust public reasoning in the face of diversity. See: (Muldoon et. al 2012).
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less ambitious in that it relies more on actual social processes and structures to carry out
the process of justification rather than the more deliberative process Rawls envisions.34
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